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Addiction shows familial aggregation and previous endophenotype research suggests
that healthy relatives of addicted individuals share altered behavioral and cognitive
characteristics with individuals suffering from addiction. In this study we asked
whether impairments in behavioral control proposed for addiction, namely a shift from
goal-directed, model-based toward habitual, model-free control, extends toward an
unaffected sample (n = 20) of adult children of alcohol-dependent fathers as compared
to a sample without any personal or family history of alcohol addiction (n = 17). Using
a sequential decision-making task designed to investigate model-free and model-based
control combined with a computational modeling analysis, we did not find any evidence
for altered behavioral control in individuals with a positive family history of alcohol
addiction. Independent of family history of alcohol dependence, we however observed
that the interaction of two different risk factors of addiction, namely impulsivity and
cognitive capacities, predicts the balance of model-free and model-based behavioral
control. Post-hoc tests showed a positive association of model-based behavior with
cognitive capacity in the lower, but not in the higher impulsive group of the original
sample. In an independent sample of particularly high- vs. low-impulsive individuals, we
confirmed the interaction effect of cognitive capacities and high vs. low impulsivity on
model-based control. In the confirmation sample, a positive association of omega with
cognitive capacity was observed in highly impulsive individuals, but not in low impulsive
individuals. Due to the moderate sample size of the study, further investigation of the
association of risk factors for addiction with model-based behavior in larger sample sizes
is warranted.
Keywords: decision-making, instrumental control, addiction, alcohol, family history, risk, impulsivity, cognitive
capacity
INTRODUCTION
Drug addiction tends to run in families and relatives of drug-dependent individuals have an
eight-fold increased risk of developing addictive disorders compared with the general population
(Merikangas et al., 1998). Endophenotype accounts of addiction postulate that unaffected relatives
share alterations in behavioral or cognitive processes similar or intermediate to those observed in
addicted individuals (Robbins et al., 2012).
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Inspired by a rich body of work in cognitive neuroscience,
recent developments in addiction research highlight a shift
from goal-directed toward habitual instrumental control systems
as biasing addicted individuals to repeatedly choose certain
maladaptive behaviors even in the face of negative consequences
(Redish, 2004; Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Redish et al., 2008;
Dayan, 2009; Hogarth et al., 2013). Indeed, there is recent
evidence from human patient studies pointing toward reduced
goal-directed control in addiction (Hogarth, 2011; Hogarth and
Chase, 2011; Sjoerds et al., 2013; Sebold et al., 2014; Voon et al.,
2015).
This view on addiction as a shift from goal-directed toward
habitual instrumental control builds upon the prominent notion
that instrumental control in healthy decision-making arises
from contributions of both a deliberative, goal-directed, and a
reflexive, habitual system (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Dolan
andDayan, 2013). Learning algorithms have amended this theory
by assessing possible underlying computations (Daw et al., 2005):
on the one hand, goal-directed behavior, as formalized in “model-
based” algorithms, uses a mental model of the environment;
future actions and potential outcomes are planned in a forward
manner and these costly computations enable flexible behavioral
adaptation. On the other hand, habitual behavior, as described
in “model-free” algorithms, is retrospective and rigid, but
computationally efficient. It relies on “stamped-in” past rewards
and neglects environmental structure.
A shift from goal-directed or model-based toward habitual or
model-free behavior has not only been suggested for addiction
itself, but also for recognized risk factors for addiction like acute
and chronic stress (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009, 2010, 2011a,b;
Schwabe et al., 2011a,b; Otto et al., 2013a; Radenbach et al.,
2015) or impulsivity (Hogarth, 2011; Hogarth et al., 2012a;
Deserno et al., 2015a). Studies in healthy at-risk populations
are of particular importance, as they help to elucidate whether
a shift toward model-free instrumental control precedes the
development of addiction or is a consequence of addictive
behavior. Further, they help to rule out potential confounders
like neurotoxic effects on brain structure and globally impaired
cognitive functioning. In particular, interindividual differences
in cognitive functioning were shown to be associated with the
degree of model-based control in healthy individuals (Otto et al.,
2013a,b; Schad et al., 2014) but also with impairments in patients
(Sebold et al., 2014).
In this study, we asked whether healthy individuals with a
positive family history of alcohol-dependence show a bias toward
model-free control as has been observed in addicted individuals.
Building on previous evidence pointing toward an important
role of impulsivity and cognitive capacity in instrumental control
within populations at risk for or suffering from addiction (Ersche
et al., 2012; Sebold et al., 2014), the study was also designed
to assess these factors as additional moderators of behavioral
control.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
20 healthy participants with a positive family history of alcohol
dependence were recruited based on the CAST-6 (Children
of Alcoholics Screening Test; Hodgins et al., 1993). We used
Limesurvey (https://www.limesurvey.org/) to send a digital
version of this self-report questionnaire to all members of the
participant database of the Max Planck Institute for Human
Cognitive and Brain Sciences for whom an e-mail address
was available. N = 1260 participants answered the CAST-6
questionnaire. Only individuals with a score ≥ 5 were included
[usually a score of score of ≥ 2 indicates a positive family history
(Hodgins et al., 1993)] in the positive family history sample. In
the lab, participants were additionally interviewed on parental
alcohol consumption, confirming their fathers’ fulfillment of
DSM-IV criteria of addiction. To exclude any influence of
potential prenatal alcohol exposure, only individuals with a father
suffering from alcohol dependence were included. Seventeen
healthy participants without a positive family history of alcohol
use disorders (CAST-6 score of zero and no indication of
any substance abuse for 1st–3rd degree relatives in a personal
interview) were included as a control group. Both groups did
not differ in age or gender distribution and were screened
for axis-1 psychiatric disorders using the SCID-IV interview
(First et al., 1997) and for presence of alcohol-related disorders
in family members (up to 3rd degree). We had originally
invited 22 participants for each experimental group. Upon
arrival in the laboratory, all participants underwent the above-
described diagnostic procedure. Based on that, seven participants
were excluded due to fulfillment of the following criteria:
history or presence of severe psychiatric symptoms or regular
illegal drug consumption as indicated by the SCID interview
(n = 3), pregnancy in the last trimester (n = 1), color
blindness (n = 1), and diagnosis of alcohol dependence
in family members other than their father (n = 2 in the
control group). Thus, none of the participants included in
our analyses fulfilled criteria of an axis-1 disorder at the
time of the study. None of the included control participants
reported alcohol-related disorders in family members (1st–3rd
degree).
To further characterize the sample, all participants
underwent neuropsychological assessment in the form
of four tests: the Digit Symbol Substitution Test (DSST;
Wechsler, 1955) and the Reitan Trailmaking Test (TMT;
Reitan, 1955) part A for processing speed, the TMT part B
for complex attention/executive function and the Backward
Digit Span Test (Wechsler, 1955) for working memory. All
test scores were z-transformed and z-transformed scores of
all four tests were averaged for a composite measurement
of cognitive capacities (compare Schlagenhauf et al., 2013).
Crystallized intelligence was examined based on a German
vocabulary test (Schmidt and Metzler, 1992). In addition,
participants completed the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford
et al., 2009), a well-established measurement to assess trait
impulsivity. Participants also indicated alcohol consumption
in the preceding 4 weeks using the Time Line Follow Back
questionnaire (Sobell and Sobell, 1992). For a detailed group
description, please see Table 1. The study was approved by
the ethics committee at the medical faculty of the University
of Leipzig and written informed consent was obtained from
all volunteers. Participants were reimbursed on an hourly
basis.
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TABLE 1 | Sample characteristics of the original sample.
With positive family history of alcohol With negative family history of alcohol Sig.
dependence (N = 20) dependence (N = 17)
Age (years) 28.65 ± 5.76 (19–42) 29.24 ± 5.47 (21–41) 0.76
Gender 10 female/10 male 8 female/9 male 0.86
DSST (19/16) 83.89 ± 10.55 (70–105) 86.75 ± 16.76 (57–120) 0.54
TMT A (19/16) 26.62 ± 8.55 (12–45) 20.46 ± 6.13 (9–31) 0.02
TMT B (19/16) 54.33 ± 26.92 (30–95) 51.06 ± 19.73 (16–88) 0.61
Digit span (19/16) 7.95 ± 2.48 (4–13) 8.06 ± 2.77 (4–14) 0.90
Z-score fluid IQ (19/16) 0.14 ± 0.66 (−1.33–0.91) 0.16 ± 0.89 (−1.61–1.83) 0.28
Verbal Intelligence (19/16) 109.79 ± 9.31 (92–129) 112.38 ± 9.14 (97–133) 0.42
BIS total (18/16) 60 ± 7.76 (49–73) 59.63 ± 7.51 (45–74) 0.89
CAST-6 5.70 ± 0.47 (5–6) 0 –
Time-Line-Follow-Back (18/17) 19.39 ± 17.97 (1–70) 20.32 ± 24.81 (0–98) 0.90
Group means with standard deviations and range in brackets are reported; for group comparisons two-tailed two-sample t-test or Chi-Square Tests were used.
Sequential Decision-Making Task
A two-step choice task was implemented as in previous studies
(e.g., Daw et al., 2011; Deserno et al., 2015a,b). The task consisted
of 201 trials; each trial involved two choice stages. At each stage,
subjects were required to give a forced choice (maximumdecision
time 2 s) between two stimuli presented; stimuli were two gray
boxes at the first stage and two pairs of differently colored
boxes at the second stage (Figure 1). The position on the screen
where stimuli were presented (left vs. right) was randomized
over trials. After a choice the respective stimulus was framed
in red and moved to the top of the screen, where it remained
for 1.5 s. Rewards were delivered only after the second-stage
choice. The reward probabilities of second-stage stimuli were
identical to Daw et al. (2011). First and second stage choices
were connected via a fixed transition probability: each first-stage
choice was associated with one pair of the second-stage stimuli
via a fixed probability of 70% (Figure 1). Each trial was ended by
an exponentially distributed inter-trial interval (ITI) with a mean
of 2 s.
During an instruction session prior to the experiment,
participants were explicitly informed that the transition structure
would not change throughout the task. Participants were also
told about the independence of reward probabilities and their
dynamic change over the course of the experiment. Participants
were instructed to win as much money as possible and informed
that the balance of their account would be paid out in addition
to the reimbursement for study participation. After detailed
instruction including teach-back, participants trained on a
shortened version of the task (50 trials) with different reward
probabilities and stimuli.
Note that inference on model-based vs. model-free control
strategies in this task is made based on the choices observed
at the first stage of the task. The rationale is that a learner
can be influenced by two sources of information to come to
a decision at the first stage. Firstly, decisions at the first stage
can be influenced by rewards obtained after the second stage.
Relying on these previously experienced rewards, in the sense of
repeating choices in the future which had led to a reward in the
past, would correspond to a habitual or model-free strategy. As a
second source of information, the learner can take the previously
acquired task structure into account. In the case of this task, the
task structure corresponds to the transition probabilities between
the two stages. Practically, this would mean repeating decisions
at the first stage based on an if-else pattern: the first-stage
choice should only be repeated if the second-stage choice was
rewarded and occurred under the common (i.e., 70% probability)
transition state. In the case where the second-stage choice was
rewarded but the coupling of the first and second stage stimulus
pair was untypical and rare (i.e., 30% probability), the first stage
choice ought—despite a (rather accidently) obtained reward for
the choice sequence—not be repeated. Combining learning from
rewards with the knowledge of the transition matrix would
correspond to a model-based strategy, which takes into account
the environmental transition structure when making decisions.
Thus, analysis of first-stage choices as a function of reward and
state (rare vs. common transition) allows for inferences about
the contribution of model-based and model-free strategies to
participants’ decision behavior.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Data were analyzed usingMATLABR2012 and Statistics Toolbox
Release 2012b (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts,
United States), IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 22
(IBM Corp., Armonk, NY) and R (R Foundation for Statistical
Computing, Vienna, Austria, http://www.R-project.org/).
Stay-switch behavior on the first step was analyzed as a
function of reward (reward or no reward) and state (common
or rare) of the previous trial. Individual stay probabilities were
subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA with reward and state
as within-subject factors and group as a between-subject factor.
Computational Modeling
The aim of model-free and model-based algorithms is to learn
values for each of the stimuli, which appear in the task as three
pairs (sA, sB, sC). sA refers to the first-stage stimuli. Importantly,
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 26
Reiter et al. Addiction Vulnerability and Model-Based Control
FIGURE 1 | Task and Raw Data Results. (A) Exemplary trial sequence. At
each stage, subjects made a choice (maximum decision time 2 s) between two
stimuli presented: two gray boxes at the first stage and two pairs of differently
colored boxes at the second stage. After this choice the respective stimulus
was framed in red, moved to the top of the screen and remained there for
1.5 s. before the subject entered the second stage, where another choice had
to be made. Reward was delivered after the second-stage choice. (B) First
and second stage choices were linked via a fixed transition probability: each
first-stage choice led to one pair of the second-stage stimuli with a probability
of 70% (C). Stay-switch behavior at the first-stage of the task was analyzed as
a function of reward and state in the previous trial. These stay probabilities
were subjected to repeated-measures ANOVAs with reward and state as
within-subject factors and group as a between-subject factor. We observed a
significant main effect of reward (F = 23.66, p < 0.001) and reward × state
interaction (F = 43.83, p < 0.001); no significant main effect of state (F = 0.95,
p = 0.34) and no significant reward × group (F = 0.38, p = 0.54), state ×
group (F = 1.85, p = 0.18) or reward × state × group (F = 0.57, p = 0.46)
interactions could be observed.
for the first stage, values derived from the model-free and model-
based algorithms differ. sB and sC refer to the two pairs of
second-stage stimuli. a refers to the chosen stimulus. The index i
denotes the two stages of the task (i = 1 for SA at the first stage
and i = 2 for SB or SC at the second stage) and the index t denotes
the trial.
First, the model-free algorithm was SARSA(λ) (state-
action-reward-state-action; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Based on
temporal-difference (TD) prediction errors, this algorithmmakes
predictions about state-action pairs and thus tracks the value for
each combination of state (here, the stimuli pairs: sA, sB, and
sC) and choice of the participant (action a) over the course of
learning.
QMF
(
si,t+ 1, ai,t+ 1
)
= QMF
(
si,t, ai,t
)
+ αiδi,t (1)
These values are updated on a trial-by-trial basis via a teaching
signal, the reward prediction error δ. The reward prediction
error captures the difference between the anticipated and actually
received reward:
δi,t = ri,t + QMF
(
si+ 1,t, ai+ 1,t
)
− QMF
(
si,t, ai,t
)
(2)
Notably, r1,t = 0, because no reward is delivered after a first-
stage choice. Further, we introduce an additional parameter λ.
λ accounts for the possibility that learners’ decisions on the first-
stage are influenced by reward prediction errors experienced at
the second stage. It thus connects the two stages of the task:
QMF
(
s1,t, a1,t
)
= QMF
(
s1,t, a1,t
)
+α1λδ2,t (3)
Note that λ additionally reflects the main effect of rewards
(delivered after the second stage’s decision) on decisions at
the first stage as observed in the raw data analysis of stay-
switch behavior. Crucially, it does not reflect an interaction
of reward and state (and thus, usage of the task structure)
on raw data choice behavior. Instead, the interaction of
reward × state would require representation of values for the
transition matrix (in the sense of learning an if-else-pattern
when mapping states to actions). TD learning represents a
principled and theory-grounded basis of habitual learning as
it requires outcome experience to retrospectively update choice
values, which substantially slows adaptation. Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that it does not map directly on a habit, which
represents automatic behavioral responses to a stimulus divorced
from its recent outcome value.
The model-based algorithm takes the transition matrix—and
thus the environmental structure of the task—into account. It
does so via computing first-stage values bymultiplyingmaximum
values (max Q) at the second stage [derived from model-free
learning as described in formula (3)] with transition probabilities:
QMB
(
sA, aj
)
= QMB
(
SB|SA, aj
)
max QMF (sB, a)
+QMB
(
SC|SA, aj
)
max QMF (sc, a) (4)
Note that in this approach the transition probabilities are not
learned explicitly. Rather, it tests whether participants use the
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task structure (which they have acquired beforehand). This
approach is in line with the task instructions where participants
enter the experimental task only after having trained on the
transition probabilities in an intense training session. Daw and
colleagues report a simulation which verified that this approach
outperforms incremental learning of the transition matrix (Daw
et al., 2011).
Third, the hybrid algorithm connects model-free and model-
based learning via the weighting factor ω:
Q
(
sA, aj
)
= ωQ
MB
(
sA, aj
)
+ (1−ω)QMF
(
sA, aj
)
(5)
Importantly, ω reflects the relative influence of model-free
and model-based values on participants’ choices. According to
formula (5), lower values of ω (0 < ω < 0.5) indicate that the
learner relies more on the reward-driven, model-free strategy
to solve the task. If ω = 0, the learner fully relies on model-
free computations and neglects the transition matrix. On the
contrary, higher values of ω (1 < ω > 0.5) assign more weight
to model-based computations, taking into account the transition
probabilities as the central environmental feature of the task.
In the case of ω = 1, the learner fully relies on model-based
computations.
Consequently, a value of 0.5 indicates balanced contributions
of both the model-free and the model-based system to choice
behavior. For the analysis at hand ω is therefore the parameter
of most interest, representing the balance and possibly also
interindividual differences in the recruitment of the two decision-
making systems.
The values derived from the algorithms described above are
transformed into action probabilities using a softmax function for
the value Q:
ρ
(
ai,t = a
∣
∣si,t
)
=
exp(βi[Q(si,t, a)+ ρ ∗ rep(a)])∑
a′ exp(βi[Q(si,t, a
′)+ ρ ∗ rep(a′)])
(6)
This choice rule includes additional parameters βi, separately
for both stages i. β controls the stochasticity of the choices.
Put differently, with higher values of β , it is more likely that
the learner takes the action with the highest expected value,
thus, choice behavior is more tightly determined by the learning
model. On the other hand, the lower the value of β , the less
likely it becomes that the learner chooses the action suggested
by the model. Thus choices are less influenced by the model or
more stochastic. Separate β for both stages are estimated as the
degree of stochasticity is assumed to be different between the
two stages. The additional parameter ρ captures first-stage choice
perseveration and rep is an indicator function that equals 1 if the
previous first-stage choice was the same. This parameter accounts
for strong perseveration at the first stage as observed in this task.
In summary, the algorithm totals seven parameters. It can be
reduced to its special cases ω = 1 (four parameters) and ω = 0
(five parameters).
Model Fitting
To infer the maximum-a-posteriori estimateMAP of parameters
θ, we use a Gaussian prior with mean and variance µ and σ:
MAPi = argmax log p(Y|θ) p (θ |µ, σ) (7)
where Y represents the data in terms of actions Ai per subject i.
We set priors empirically to the maximum likelihood estimates
ML of µ and σ given the data by all subjects:
MLi = argmax log p(Y|θ) (8)
and achieve this by using Expectation-Maximization. For an
in-depth description please compare Huys et al. (2011, 2012).
All seven parameters of the best-fitting model were subjected
to a multivariate ANOVA with group (family history:
positive/negative) as a between-subject factor. Constrained
parameters were transformed to a logistic (α, λ,ω) or exponential
(β) distribution to enforce constraints and to render normally
distributed parameter estimates.
Model Selection
To compare models for their relative goodness of fit, we
computed the model evidence by integrating out free parameters.
This integral was approximated by sampling from the empirical
prior distribution (Huys et al., 2011, 2012). The integrated
likelihood was subjected to the spm_BMS function contained in
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) to compute expected
posterior probabilities and their exceedance probabilities (XP)
(Stephan et al., 2009).
Regression Models and Moderator
Analyses
To test the potential influence of impulsivity and cognitive
capacities on the balance of model-based and model-free
behavioral control, we built a linear regression model with ω
as dependent variable and family history (positive vs. negative),
impulsivity (BIS-11 total score), sum score across cognitive
capacities as predictor variables. In all models, we additionally
included age as nuisance variable as it is known to impact model-
based behavior (Eppinger et al., 2013). Further, the negative log-
likelihood of the hybrid model was included as independent
variable to control for unspecific effects of individual variability
in model fit. To test potentially interacting effects of the risk
factors onω, we applied moderator analyses (Hayes andMatthes,
2009).
RESULTS
Behavioral Raw Data
As in previous studies with the same task (e.g., Daw et al., 2011;
Deserno et al., 2015b), analysis of stay-switch behavior at the
first-stage as a function of reward and state in the previous trial
revealed a main effect of reward (F(1, 35) = 23.657, p < 0.001)
and a reward × state interaction effect on first-stage decisions
(F(1, 35) = 43.826, p < 0.001, Figure 1C). In individuals with a
positive family history of alcohol dependence neither evidence
for a reduction of model-based choices (reward × state × family
history interaction F(1, 35) = 0.570, p = 0.461, Figure 1C) nor
for a shift toward model-free control (reward × family history
interaction F(1, 35) = 0.379, p = 0.542, Figure 1C), nor a main
effect of group on stay/switch behavior (F(1, 35) = 0.029, p =
0.864) was observed.
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Computational Modeling
We compared three computational models: a model-based
algorithm (ω = 1), a model-free algorithm (ω = 0) and a hybrid
model with ω as a free parameter. Confirming previous studies
with the same task and modeling analysis, model selection across
all participants revealed that the hybrid model explained the
observed choice behavior best (XP model-based = 0.029, XP
model-free = 0.006, XP hybrid model = 0.965). See Table 2
for the distribution of the best-fitting parameters of the hybrid
model. With respect to family history of alcohol dependence,
we tested for between group differences by subjecting all seven
parameters of the hybrid model to a multivariate ANOVA
(mANOVA) with family history (positive/negative) as between-
subject factor. There was no significant effect of group (F(7, 29) =
0.760, p = 0.280). Thus, the mANOVA did not indicate any
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that parameters of the
model do not differ between the two experimental groups.
Evidence in Favor of the Null Hypothesis
Traditional frequentist analyses do not allow to infer evidence in
favor of the null- vs. the alternative hypothesis. By contrast, Bayes
factors quantify the support that the data provide for the null
hypothesis vis-a-vis the alternative hypothesis. Thus, to examine
the suggested null finding in a post-hoc manner, we used JASP
(Love et al., 2015) to compute one-sided Bayesian independent t-
tests between groups (Rouder et al., 2009; Wetzels et al., 2009).
A Cauchy prior with a width of r = 1 for the effect size of
the alternative hypothesis was used (Rouder et al., 2009; Wetzels
et al., 2009; Wagenmakers et al., 2015). As explained above, the
balance between model-based and model-free control was of
most interest in the analysis at hand. Indicative of this balance is
the parameterω and comparing this parameter showedmoderate
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis as indicated by a Bayes
Factor B01 ∼6 (see Table 3). A similar effect was present for the
interaction term of reward × state in the raw data reflecting
the degree of model-based control. A Bayes Factor B01 of 6
indicates that the observed data are six times more likely under
the null hypothesis that participants with and without positive
family history of alcohol-dependence do not differ with regards
to the balance of model-based vs. model-free control. In addition,
comparing the parameters of the hybrid model between groups
revealed evidence in favor of the null hypothesis in most of the
TABLE 2 | Distribution of best-fitting parameters (hybrid model).
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max
β1 2.56 5.09 6.47 7.02 8.23 14.11
β2 1.38 2.64 3.15 3.63 4.19 7.96
α1 0.07 0.36 0.50 0.51 0.67 0.83
α2 0.04 0.41 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.91
λ 0.23 0.49 0.65 0.62 0.78 0.93
ω 0.34 0.55 0.66 0.63 0.73 0.83
ρ 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.32
−LL −280.60 −217.70 −188.80 −183.90 −156.80 −88.43
Min, minimum; 1st/3rd Qu, first and third quartile; Max, maximum.
cases (as indicated by a Bayes Factor B01 of> 3 (Kass and Raftery,
1995). See Table 3 for results.
Repeating the Analyses with an Increased
Sample Size
As stated above, the sample size for this study was at the lower
end. As one of our reviewers expressed concerns about the
resulting lack of power to detect a true effect, we increased
sample size in both groups. This was achieved by adding datasets,
which had been acquired for other studies on different research
questions but using the same task (subjects were taken from the
following studies: Sebold et al., 2014; Deserno et al., 2015a,b;
Radenbach et al., 2015 plus three unpublished datasets). For
subjects included in these studies, information on family history
of alcohol-dependence was available or could be obtained in
a follow-up interview. All participants had been screened for
substance-related disorders, and were excluded in case of any
indication. Eight subjects with an alcohol-dependent father could
be identified (n = 4 from Deserno et al., 2015a, n = 1 from
Radenbach et al., 2015, n = 3 unpublished) and were matched
with n = 11 participants without any family history of alcohol
addiction (n = 7 from Sebold et al., 2014, n = 4 from Deserno
et al., 2015b) in order to yield equal samples sizes. This resulted
in an increased sample size of n = 28 gender- and age-matched
participants per group (n = 11 female participants per group;
negative family history group: mean age = 29.500 years, SD =
6.173; positive family history group: mean age = 29.393 years,
SD = 7.325). Repeating the above described analyses did not
yield any divergent results regarding model-based and model-
free behavior: the reward × state × family history interaction
did not show a significant effect (F(1, 54) = 0.321, p= 0.575). The
interaction of reward x group (F(1, 54) = 0.331, p = 0.570) and
the main effect of group were also not significant (F(1, 54)= 0.722,
p = 0.401). Further, we did not find any evidence for a group
TABLE 3 | Results of Bayesian t-tests probing the hypothesis that model
parameters and the interaction term of reward × state as a raw data
indicator for the degree of model-based behavior is lower in participants
with alcohol-dependent fathers as compared to participants without
positive family history.
Bayesian Independent Samples T-Test
B01 error (%)
Interaction score raw data 6.691 ∼1.596e−4
β1 1.447 ∼1.751e
−4
β2 1.838 ∼1.651e
−4
α1 11.172 ∼4.376e
−6
α2 4.290 ∼1.448e
−4
λ 5.395 ∼1.489e−4
ω 5.933 ∼1.528e−4
ρ 7.781 ∼1.727e−4
In the table, we show evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. By convention, a Bayes
factor > 3 indicates evidence in favor of the hypothesis (Kass and Raftery, 1995). The
Bayes Factor is interpretable as an Odds Ratio: for example, it is more than six times
more likely that the data occurred under the null hypothesis that interaction of reward and
state does not differ between groups than under the alternative hypothesis of a difference
between groups.
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difference on the parameter ω from the computational modeling
analysis (t(1, 54) = .358, p = 0.722). In accordance with these
results, which point toward a null finding, Bayesian independent
t-tests on the raw data interaction score and the parameter ω
revealed Bayes Factors of B01 = 7.316 and B01 = 6.405 in favor
of the null hypothesis that the two groups do not differ in terms
of model-based behavior.
Cognitive Capacities and Impulsivity as
Potential Moderator Variables
As we did not observe alterations in the balance of model-
free and model-based control to be associated with positive
family history per se, we additionally tested for the influence of
impulsivity as a risk factor associated with positive family history
(Ersche et al., 2013) and cognitive capacities as they have been
reported to moderate group effects on model-based behavior
(Sebold et al., 2014). In a linear regression model with ω as
dependent variable and family history, impulsivity, sum score
across cognitive capacities as predictor variables, as well as age
and the negative log-likelihood as nuisance variables, the effect of
cognitive capacity reached significance (beta = 0.437, t = 2.076,
p = 0.048) but there was no effect of the risk factors family
history (beta= 0.186, t = 1.065 p = 0.296) or impulsivity (beta=
0.180, t = 1.031, p = 0.312).
Next, we aimed to probe whether the effect of cognitive
capacities on model-based control is moderated by the two risk
factors family history and impulsivity, respectively. See Figure 2
for the distribution of impulsivity scores in this sample and the
subsequently described confirmation sample. In the respective
moderator analyses, the interaction between positive family and
cognitive capacities did not show a significant effect (R2-change
due to interaction = 0.002, F = 0.058, p = 0.810), whereas the
interaction effect between impulsivity (BIS score) and cognitive
capacities on ω was significant (R2-change due to interaction =
0.127, adjusted R2-change due to interaction = 0.122, F =
5.256, p = 0.030, Figure 3A). To account for a potential effect
of outliers on the observed findings, we performed a robust
regression analysis with a bisquare reweighting function and
confirmed the significant finding (beta = −0.338, t = −2.158,
p = 0.040). Note that as group was included as a regressor in the
model, the analysis accounts for possible influences of positive
family history on this interaction effect of cognitive capacity and
impulsivity on ω.
We also explored the included neurocognitive subdomains by
subsequently entering the four different test scores (TMTA, TMT
B, DS, DSST) as independent variable in separate moderator
analyses (dependent variable ω, moderator variable impulsivity).
This revealed a positive effect of executive control (TMT B)
(R2 change due to interaction = 0.136, adjusted R2 change
due to interaction = 0.131, F = 5.348, p = 0.029) on the
association of impulsivity and model-based behavior, whereas
the other cognitive subdomains failed to contribute significantly
to an interaction effect (TMT A: F = 2.588, p = 0.119, DS:
F = 3.310 p = 0.0763, DSST: F = 2.900, p = 0.100, R2
changes due to interaction≤ 0.090). We explored this interaction
effect in a post-hoc fashion by using the median of the BIS score
FIGURE 2 | Density function of BIS-11 values in the original sample and
the confirmation sample. The different distributions are due to differences in
recruitment strategy: in the confirmation sample, participants were specifically
chosen based on particularly low vs. high values on the BIS-11 (Deserno et al.,
2015a).
to split our sample in a subgroup with higher vs. lower trait
impulsivity scores. The regression analysis was then repeated
for those groups separately. We observed that the interaction
effect between impulsivity and executive control was driven by a
significant effect of executive control on ω in the lower impulsive
subgroup (beta = 0.591, t = 2.574, p = 0.024). There was no
association of executive control and ω in the higher impulsive
subgroup (beta = −0.110, t = 0.341, p = 0.738). See Figure 4
for an illustration.
Cognitive Capacities, Impulsivity, and
Model-Based Choices: Confirmation
Analysis in an Independent Sample
Using the same task and computational modeling analysis,
we previously investigated the association between high vs.
low trait impulsivity (defined according to BIS-11) and the
balance between model-based and model-free decision-making
(Deserno et al., 2015a). In this independent study, young (age
range: 20–33 years) and healthy participants were recruited
via the participant database of the Max Planck Institute for
Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences: fifty healthy participants
were drawn from the upper and lower ends of 452 individuals
completing the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale online and invited
to the lab. Using fMRI and the above-described sequential
decision-making task together with the computational modeling
analysis as applied here, the study was designed to compare
high- vs. low-impulsive individuals regarding behavioral and
neural signatures of model-based and model-free behavioral
control. In short, no behavioral evidence for an influence of
high vs. low trait impulsivity on the parameter ω was found.
For a detailed description of recruitment strategy, sample
characteristics and results, please compare Deserno et al.
(2015a). Given the above reported findings, we now reanalyzed
these data with respect to an interaction effect of impulsivity
and cognitive capacity on ω, an analysis that had not been
performed in the original investigation. All datasets included in
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FIGURE 3 | Model-based behavior and cognitive capacity. (A) Association of model-based behavior (as given by the parameter omega) with cognitive capacity
(Z-score of fluid intelligence) in the lower, but not in the higher impulsive group of the original sample. (B) In the confirmation sample, a positive association of omega
with cognitive capacity was found in the high-impulsive subgroup. In the original sample, high and low impulsive groups were defined based on a median split. In the
confirmation sample, groups were defined by sampling from the upper and lower ends of the BIS-11 range in a larger sample (n = 452) according to their particularly
high vs. low values in the BIS-11 (Deserno et al., 2015a).
FIGURE 4 | Post-hoc tests with cognitive subdomains. (A) In the original sample, omega correlates positively with TMT B in the low impulsivity group. (B) In the
confirmation sample, omega correlates positively with DSST scores in the high impulsivity group. In the original sample, high- and low-impulsive groups were defined
based on a median split. In the confirmation sample, groups were defined by sampling from the upper and lower ends of the BIS-11 range in a larger sample (n = 452)
according to their particularly high vs. low values in the BIS-11 (Deserno et al., 2015a). We plot z-transformed scores of the cognitive test scores.
the previous investigation (n = 50, 24 high-impulsive and 26
low-impulsive participants) were reanalyzed for confirmation.
It is important to note that in the original study, participants
were selected from the upper and lower ends of the BIS-11 range
in a larger sample (n = 452) according to their particularly
high vs. low values in the BIS-11. According to the previous
literature (Stanford et al., 2009), mean total BIS-scores of
each group met the criteria for high or low impulsiveness,
respectively. This difference in the study design results in a
different distribution of total BIS scores in the confirmation
sample from Deserno et al. (2015a) as compared to the original
sample of participants with and without positive family history
of alcohol-dependence (compare Figure 2). Specifically, the
respective high- vs. low-impulsive subgroups of both samples
were significantly different from each other (comparing lower
impulsive groups of the original and confirmation sample
using an independent samples t-test: meanoriginal_sample =
53.625, SD = 4.674, meanconfirmation_sample = 50.308, SD =
3.782, t(26.900) = 2.397, p = 0.024; comparing higher
impulsive groups of the original and confirmation sample:
meanoriginal_sample = 65.333 SD= 4.703, meanconfirmation_sample =
74.792, SD = 5.065, t(38.000) = 6.214, p < 0.001). See
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Figure 2 for a plot of the distribution of BIS values in the two
samples.
We repeated the identical analyses as described above in the
confirmation sample: a moderator analysis with ω as dependent
variable, independent variable sum score cognitive capacities,
moderator variable impulsivity, as well as age and negative
log-likelihood of the hybrid model as nuisance variables was
conducted. Confirming the findings in the original sample, we
again found a significant interaction effect of impulsivity and
cognitive capacities on ω (R2 increase due to interaction =
0.081, adjusted R2 increase due to interaction = 0.069, F =
4.669, p = 0.036, Figure 3B). Robust regression based on a
bisquare reweighting function confirmed this finding (beta =
0.297, t = 2.097, p = 0.042). Next, we again tested for the role
of the included cognitive subdomains and thus entered the four
different test scores (TMT A, TMT B, DS, DSST) as independent
variables in separate moderator analyses (dependent variable ω,
moderator variable impulsivity). This revealed a significant effect
of the interaction “cognitive speed (DSST) by impulsivity” (R2
increase due to interaction = 0.111, adjusted R2 increase due
to interaction = 0.103, F = 6.906, p = 0.012), and of the
interaction “attention (TMT A) by impulsivity” (R2 increase due
to interaction = 0.080, adjusted R2 increase due to interaction =
0.068, F = 64.594, p = 0.038) on ω. Executive control (TMT B,
R2 increase due to interaction = 0.048, F = 2.685, p = 0.109)
and working memory (Digit Span, R2 increase due to interaction
≤ 0.001, F = 0.043, p = 0.836) did not significantly interact
with impulsivity in their effect on ω. Post-hoc regression analyses
for both groups (high- vs. low-impulsive individuals) separately
revealed that this effect was driven by a significant relation of
cognitive speed (DSST) onω in the high-impulsive group (beta=
0.503, t = 2.683, p = 0.014); this was absent in the low-impulsive
group (beta=−0.126, t = 0.629, p = 0.536, Figure 4B). Post-hoc
analyses for TMT A did not indicate a significant effect of TMT
A in any of the groups (Beta< 0.309, t < 1.649, p > 0.110).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we did not observe evidence for altered
model-free and model-based instrumental control in adult
participants with an alcohol-dependent father. Independent of
family history, our findings however suggest that an interaction
of impulsivity and cognitive capacities influences the degree
of model-based decision-making. The latter effect could be
confirmed in an independent sample of high and low impulsive
individuals (Deserno et al., 2015a).
Family History of Addiction and
Model-Based Control
The present work does not provide evidence in favor of a shift
from model-based to model-free control in healthy participants
with family history of alcohol-dependence. At first glance,
this seems in contrast to findings with the same sequential
decision task in addicted and other psychiatric patient samples
characterized by loss over behavioral control (Sebold et al.,
2014; Voon et al., 2015): in these two studies, patients suffering
from addictive and other compulsive disorders showed reduced
model-based control. It is interesting that, specifically for alcohol-
addiction, after a closer look, a more complex picture arises:
Voon and colleagues found no reduction of model-based control
in alcohol-dependent subjects per se but a correlation of model-
based control with duration of abstinence (Voon et al., 2015). In
the study by Sebold and colleagues, reduced model-based control
was found in alcohol-dependent patients overall but effects were
attenuated when adjusting for general cognitive functioning
(Sebold et al., 2014). Based on the presented null finding in
relatives, one might speculate that reduced model-based control
arises as a consequence of chronic alcohol-consumption rather
than preceding it as a vulnerability factor. Interestingly, Hogarth
and colleagues demonstrated that acute alcohol administration
indeed leads to reduced goal-directed control in a devaluation
paradigm (Hogarth et al., 2012b). Participants showed a reduced
effect of devaluation on choice behavior under the acute influence
of alcohol compared with placebo.
An additional explanation takes into account our cross-
sectional design and the inclusion criteria of unaffected adult
participants without any indication of alcohol abuse or other
addictive behavior and within an age-range that exceeds the
typical onset of addictive disorders. Given this sample selection
strategy, participants included in this study might be those who
were particularly resilient not to develop an addictive disorder—
and thus show no alteration in behavioral control. In a previous
study, Volkow and colleagues have found putatively protective
traits in terms of dopaminergic neurotransmission in a similar
sample of unaffected adult relatives of addicted patients (Volkow
et al., 2006) and follow the same line of reasoning. To tackle
this important question appropriately, longitudinal designs are
required to map instrumental control across the developmental
process from risk to addiction in adolescence to abstinence and
potential relapse in adulthood.
Further, it is to be noted that our study comprised a
rather small sample size albeit in a similar range as the
previous between-group patient studies (Sebold et al., 2014; Voon
et al., 2015). Thus, the null finding of an absent association
between family history of addiction requires replication in a
larger population, ideally including 1st degree relatives not
only of alcohol-dependent subjects, but also of other substance
addictions and other psychiatric states characterized by loss of
behavioral control like Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder or Binge
Eating. In sum, due to the small sample size, the findings of
the present study should be interpreted with caution and by no
means be taken as finally conclusive. Rather, they are meant to
provide a first empirical hint for the field, in order to stimulate
further investigation of the theoretically plausible association of
addiction vulnerability and the degree of model-based behavior.
Recently, online versions of the sequential decision-making task
applied have been successfully implemented (Gillan et al., 2015;
Otto et al., 2015) which might be a promising venue for testing
the research question at hand in larger sample sizes.
Addiction, Cognitive Capacities, and
Instrumental Control
Studies suggest that interindividual variability in cognitive
capacities relates to a model-based system (Otto et al., 2013a,b;
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Schad et al., 2014) which was indeed shown to moderate
group differences in studies involving patients characterized
by cognitive impairment (Sebold et al., 2014). These and our
findings suggest that, when observing differences in instrumental
control between groups which differ systematically in cognitive
factors, one ought to tread carefully when interpreting these;
differences might be an epiphenomenon of a more general
impairment rather than a specific characteristic for alcohol-
dependence. This is also in line with a study using instructed
devaluation tasks in alcohol-dependent patients, which revealed
a global impairment in learning per se (Sjoerds et al., 2013).
Here, we replicate the previously reported correlation between
cognitive function and model-based control (Schad et al., 2014;
Sebold et al., 2014) and find evidence for interaction effects
between cognitive function and impulsivity, a recognized risk
factor for addiction, on model-based control.
Regarding the correlations between model-based control and
general cognition, two aspects should be taken into account. First,
as proposed theoretically, model-based computations underlying
goal-directed behavior are expensive, thus, they occupy cognitive
resources. In this vein, model-free computations underlying
habitual behavior can be seen as the cognitively less demanding
solution to the task. Indeed, this may bias individuals with
relatively higher or lower cognitive capacities per se to one or
the other way to solve the task. As mentioned before, there
is good evidence for such correlations between model-based
control in this task and cognitive measures such as cognitive
speed and working memory (Otto et al., 2013a, 2015; Schad
et al., 2014). Explicitly manipulating cognitive load via a dual task
challenge reduces the degree of model-based decision-making
in this task (Otto et al., 2013b). In healthy individuals, one can
regard this as proof of construct validity thatmodel-based control
in this task is indeed a computationally more costly solution.
Secondly, all cross-sectional between-group findings with this
task in clinical populations related to the degree of model-
based control and reduced cognitive capacities are a characteristic
of these clinical populations, such as addiction and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Sebold et al., 2014; Voon et al., 2015).
Interestingly, reduced model-based control in alcohol addiction
compared to healthy controls was indeed related to the reduction
in cognitive speed seen in these patients and group differences did
no longer reach significance when adjusting for cognitive speed
(Sebold et al., 2014). Thus, whether reduced model-based control
in patients constitutes a disease-specific mechanism or results
from general cognitive impairments can only be teased apart in
future longitudinal studies.
Impulsivity, Cognitive Capacities, and
Instrumental Control
Interestingly, cognitive dysfunction itself (more specifically,
reduced executive functioning), as well as the combination of
deficits in cognitive function and impulsivity have been suggested
as endophenotypes for drug dependence (Ersche et al., 2012).
Thus, our finding of an interaction of cognitive functioning
and impulsivity on model-based behavior in two independent
samples amends previous studies reporting on an influence of
impulsivity on reduced goal-directed control in a devaluation
task (Hogarth et al., 2012a) or on accentuated model-free control
together with intact model-based control (Deserno et al., 2015a).
Our findings in the original investigation and in an independent
confirmation sample suggest that the interaction of cognitive
capacities and impulsivity plays an important role. Interestingly,
in the sample at hand, for which impulsivity measures were not
the selection criterion, a positive correlation of cognitive capacity
and model-based behavioral control was found in the relatively
lower impulsive group. To interpret this finding, one might
speculate that relatively, but not extremely low impulsiveness
in addition to relatively high cognitive capacities provides an
optimal ground for model-based control in this task. In the
confirmation sample, which was specifically recruited to consist
of a low vs. a highly impulsive group from the extreme ends of
the impulsivity measures, impulsivity scores at the higher end
matched those of addicted patients. Interestingly, in this sample
the correlation of cognitive speed with model-based behavior was
driven by the high-impulsive group, suggesting it as a potential
compensatory factor in high-impulsive individuals, which were
initially assumed to be impaired in goal-directed, model-based
behavioral control (Deserno et al., 2015a; Hogarth et al., 2012a).
CONCLUSION
In sum, we did not find evidence for an influence of the risk
factors positive family history or impulsivity on model-based
control per se. Due to the limited sample size, this finding has
to be interpreted with caution and warrants further investigation
in larger sample sizes. Our findings could speak in favor of
a multiple hits account with different risk conditions playing
together to impair or protect model-based behavioral control.
Longitudinal designs might help to disentangle these rather
complicated interaction effects on model-based control and
eventually, on the potential development of addiction.
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